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‘I WILL NOT WEEP’: READING THROUGH THE
TEARS OF HENRY MACKENZIE’S MAN OF FEELING
The Limits of Tears
Tears are the crux of both the success and the failure of Henry Mackenzie’s
ﬁrst novel, The Man of Feeling (1771). Fragmented, short, episodic, and over-
abounding with scenes of weeping, TheMan of Feeling was immensely popular
in its day. Its success in the 1770s was due to its capacity to move and a·ect
deeply, drawing the reader into a culture of tears. As contemporary opinions
testify, crying over The Man of Feeling was the test of the sensibility of its early
readers, by whom tears were not only valued, but, by the time of the novel’s
publication, were more or less compulsory attributes and signiﬁers of a feeling
heart and unquestionable morality. The anonymous critic of the Monthly Re-
view insists that anyone ‘who weeps not over some of the scenes it describes,
has no sensibility of mind’.
Tears, however, did not always come easily for everyone. In 1826LadyLouisa
Stewart recalls a childhood memory about the time when the novel was ﬁrst
published. As she writes to Sir Walter Scott: ‘I remember so well its ﬁrst pub-
lication, my mother and sisters crying over it, dwelling upon it with rapture!
And when I read it, as I was a girl of fourteen not yet versed in sentiment, I had
a secret dread I should not cry enough to gain the credit of proper sensibility.’
Those young and innocent minds on whom the culture of sensibility models
itself paradoxically have to become versed in the feelings they are naturally
expected to possess. As Harley, the hero ofMackenzie’s novel, reﬂects: ‘Our de-
licacies [. . .] are fantastic; they are not in nature!’ Harley himself, always iden-
tiﬁed as the over-sentimental character of Mackenzie’s novel, is surprisingly
tearless at many critical moments. For instance, on the morning of his depar-
ture for London, his aunt says goodbye to him ‘with a tear on her cheek’ (p. 58).
Peter, Harley’s faithful servant, is ‘choaked with the thought, and his benedic-
tion could not be heard’ (p. 59). The only person who can resist tears is Harley
himself. He ‘shook [Peter] by the hand as he passed, smiling, as if he said, “I will
not weep”’ (p. 59). Harley’s smile is turned into a cover for repressed tears only
by the narrator’s speculation. The narrator, through the lens of his sentimental
expectations, trains the reader to read emotionally, to read through his tears.
This article will investigate the ways in which tears become central signiﬁers
 Monthly Review, 44 (1771), 418.
 Letter to Sir Walter Scott of 4 September 1826, in The Private Letter-Books of Sir Walter
Scott, ed. by Wilfred Partington (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1930), pp. 271–73 (p. 273).
Lady Stewart also points out the rather di·erent e·ect thatMackenzie’s novel had on its readers a
few decades later. When her circle of friends read aloud The Man of Feeling, ‘the e·ect altogether
failed.Nobodycried, and at some of the passages, the touches that I used to think so exquisite—Oh
Dear! They laughed.’ She goes on to observe that Rousseau’sLa Nouvelle H‹elo•§se, ‘the book that
allmothersprohibitedand all daughters longed to read’ in her youth, is found tiring and dull by the
younger generations in the 1820s (p. 273). For changing reading—and weeping—practices in the
eighteenthcentury seeAnneVincent-Bu·ault,TheHistory of Tears: SensibilityandSentimentality
in France (Basingstoke and London:Macmillan, 1990).
 HenryMackenzie,The Man of Feeling, ed. byMaureen Harkin (Plymouth: Broadview, 2005),
p. 59. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text.
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of sympathetic emotional exchange in Mackenzie’s novel. John Dwyer avers
that the role and complexity of tearful scenes in The Man of Feeling have been
underestimated by most modern critics of Mackenzie’s novel, who take the
abundance of tears in thenovel to be the sign ofmelodramatic and self-indulgent
emotionalism. There is a tendency, Dwyer claims, to caricature the novel’s
tearfulness and overlook its pioneering psychological methods as well as their
moral purpose and enormous ideological power.Taking upDwyer’s point, this
article will focus on one important aspect of the novel’s intricate web of tearful
responses, namely theway inwhich tears of sympathy formpart of a sentimental
reading practice. In other words, I shall explore the mechanism through which
a narrative and psychological method can become a powerful ideological tool.
Recent scholarship, however, tends to be more concerned with the widen-
ing gap between sentimental morality and eighteenth-century social conduct
than with the interactions between the two. The novel’s melancholy tone, the
inability of its hero, Harley, to achieve his goals in the competitive context
of his society, as well as his isolation and death are frequently interpreted as
an allegory of the failure of the morals of sensibility to function within the
social practice of the period. According to John Mullan, the publication of
The Man of Feeling in 1771 marks a turning-point in the history of the genre,
when ‘sentimental morality cannot reﬂect at all on the practice of any exist-
ing society’. The culture of self-interest, he claims, builds up a sentimental
fantasy, victimizing and isolating those who blindly and naively try to live up
to its values. Susan Manning sees Mackenzie’s life work as a sceptical enquiry
into the e·ects of sentiment on human behaviour, while Stephen Bending and
Stephen Bygrave claim that the sentimental novel has limited answers to the
political problems of its time.upsilonaspertilde Maureen Harkin reads Mackenzie’s novel as
a self-conscious dramatization of the powerlessness of novels to intervene in
the social sphere. Rather than exposing the failure of sentiment to produce
a viable ethical practice, she claims, The Man of Feeling tackles the limits of
the novel’s potential for changing the social sphere and for producing commu-
nity. Through its tropes of mutilation, destruction, and vulnerability of texts
and objects, the novel negotiates conﬂicting positions about the possibility of
 JohnDwyer, ‘EnlightenedSpectatorsandClassicalMoralists:SympatheticRelations in Eight-
eenth-Century Scotland’, in Sociability and Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland, ed. by John
Dwyer and Richard B. Sher (Edinburgh:Mercat, 1993), pp. 96–118 (p. 112).
 John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 114–46 (pp. 118–19), and ‘The Language of Sentiment:
Hume, Smith, and HenryMackenzie’, in TheHistory of Scottish Literature, ed. by AndrewHook,
2 vols (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), ii, 273–88 (p. 275). See also Janet Todd’s
chronology of the development of sensibility in the period in Sensibility: An Introduction (Lon-
don: Methuen, 1986), p. 3. For the insistence of criticism on Harley’s unﬁtness for the world
see also David G. Spencer, ‘Henry Mackenzie: A Practical Sentimentalist’, Papers on Language
and Literature, 3 (1967), 314–26; G. J. Barker-Benﬁeld, The Culture of Sensibility (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 142 and 144; Gillian Skinner, Sensibility and
Economics in the Novel, 1740–1800 (London:Macmillan, 1999), p. 92.
upsilonaspertilde Susan Manning, introduction, in Henry Mackenzie, Julia de Roubign‹e (East Linton: Tuck-
well, 1999), pp. v–xxvi (p. ix); Stephen Bending and Stephen Bygrave, introduction, in Henry
Mackenzie, The Man of Feeling, ed. by Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001),
pp. vii–xxiv (p. xvii).
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literature as a form of social critique. While providing images of distress and
sympathy, it spells out no e·ective means of opposition to the ills it depicts.
What is not emphasized enough in today’s scholarship, however, is that—
despite the recognized doubt concerning the practicability of sentimental values
in the period—Mackenzie’s novel is successful in realizing a very important,
a·ective, agenda precisely through its tears. The novel demonstrates a belief
in the ability of sentimental ﬁction intensively to form and reform the reading
public, self-consciously acting out how such an education in feeling is brought
about. As the responses of its ﬁrst readers demonstrate, tears, while they could
indeed be signs of truthful emotional reaction, were, at the same time, e·ective
means by which a culture established its ideologies through the individual’s af-
fective responses.	Mackenzie’s novel shows how an institutionalized culture of
sensibility is produced, while demonstrating its own involvement in such cul-
tural production. The novel enacts the process through which society becomes
‘versed in sentiment’, as it happens through individual processes of reading and
a text’s appeal to the individual on an emotional level. While it is true that The
Man of Feeling does not directly draw up any agenda for the reformation of so-
cial ills, it shows how literature can realize its social and political agenda on the
level of the individual’s emotions. Mackenzie thus reveals the way in which the
sentimental reader—a highly political product—is constructed by the means
of reading itself. Far from representing a failure actively to participate in the
social, bothTheMan of Feeling and its contemporary success demonstrate how
a process of interpretation through a·ective response has the potential to con-
nect ﬁction and life, and thus instantiates how reading that is performed in the
private sphere also has public, social, and political stakes. This reading practice,
however, is problematic: where reading is expected to be a scene of sympathy
it will be burdened with the moral ambivalence and discontent inherent in the
concept of sympathy itself.
Through an analysis of Mackenzie’s novel in the context of the literature and
philosophy of sensibility, this essay will trace the way in which the text self-
consciously enacts the reader’s education via the culture of tears. The Man of
Feeling is said to be themost tearful novel of the eighteenth century, yet, I argue,
its a·ectivity should not be taken for granted. Harley’s sentimentality is created
in front of our eyes by those who read and narrate him, drawing the reader of
the novel into a similar, mimetic mode of interpretation. The mind of Harley
is constructed like a mirror—alluding to the philosophical constructions of the
feeling subject as imagined by David Hume and Adam Smith—which reveals
more about those who read him than about Harley himself. Harley’s mind not
only reﬂects, but also improves the complexions of those who look into it. In
 MaureenHarkin, ‘Mackenzie’sMan of Feeling: EmbalmingSensibility’,ELH, 61 (1994), 317–
40 (pp. 318–19, 336). In the introduction to her edition of The Man of Feeling Harkin points out
the emphasis in sentimental novels on ‘instructing the reader how to react, how to feel’. But in
addition, Harkin claims, Mackenzie is highly conscious of ‘the futility of e·ort that emerges in
sentimental ﬁction’: The Man of Feeling, ed. by Harkin, pp. 9–38 (pp. 12–13).
	 For a history of tears and their role in the eighteenth century to represent true emotional
response see Tom Lutz, Crying: The Natural and Cultural History of Tears (London and New
York: Norton, 1999), pp. 50–52. For a variety of psychological views on tears see Adult Cry-
ing: A Biopsychosocial Approach, ed. by Randolph R. Cornelius and J. J. M. Vingerhoets (Hove:
Brunner-Routledge, 2001).
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this way, he is never the subject in question, but instead brings about a shift of
focus, turning both narrator and reader into men of feeling. I shall argue that
the ‘man of feeling’ consists in an always shifting perspective; it is a technique
of reading rather than a clearly deﬁned character type. The sentimental feeling
subject is inseparable from a reading practice that operates through emotional
response. The tears of the man of feeling always mark ambivalent moments
of sympathy, which are also staged in other novels of the period, including
Sarah Fielding’s The Adventures of David Simple (1744), Oliver Goldsmith’s
The Vicar of Wakeﬁeld (1766), Laurence Sterne’s Sentimental Journey (1768),
and Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria; or, The Wrongs of Woman (1798). Novels
of sentiment critically reﬂect on Enlightenment theories of sympathy, where
fellow feeling unsettles the boundaries of the self and blurs the distinction be-
tween self and other. They warn us that moments of sympathy can cast doubt
on true altruistic motive and can help maintain existing power structures. The
ambivalent tears of sympathy, as we shall see, are the common concerns of
eighteenth-century sensibility and intersubjective psychoanalytic theory.
Mackenzie’s introductory chapter well illustrates how the novel of sensibility
ﬁnds—and even produces—its own sympathetic readers. It positions the novel
as a fragmented, damaged manuscript found by two unsuccessful hunters. The
narrator and the curate, after the disappointment of missing their prey, look
around to contemplate the melancholy locale, and talk about a man called
Harley who had once lived there. Here the curate presents his company with a
bundle of papers used by him as wadding—papers that contain the history of
Harley in whom the narrator has taken an interest:
‘I should be glad to see this medley,’ said I. ‘You shall see it now’, answered the curate,
‘for I always take it along with me a-shooting.’ ‘How came it so torn?’ ‘’Tis excellent
wadding’, said the curate.—This was a plea of expediency I was not in condition to
answer; for I had actually in my pocket great part of an edition of one of the German
Illustrissimi, for the very same purpose. We exchanged books; and by that means (for
the curate was a strenuous logician) we probably saved both. (pp. 48–49)
While the narrator saves the manuscript that has been abused by the curate,
it turns out that he himself treated his German Illustrissimi unkindly. Every
text, the novel seems to say, has its own reader—and the novel of sensibility can
be salvaged only by those kind-hearted creatures who are ‘a good deal a·ected
with some very triﬂing passages in it’ (p. 49). The survival of the text is due to
its capacity to a·ect its reader almost to the point of tears. Its powers cannot
extend to all readers, only to those select few who possess enough sensibility to
be able to enjoy its ‘medley’.
In Mackenzie’s theory, formulated at the time of the novel’s composition,
sensibility mechanically operates among the members of a community who
possess the capacity for reﬁned feeling. He explains to his cousin, Elizabeth
Rose of Kilravock, that the language of sentiment works by a sudden recogni-
tion of some hidden capacity that has always been there in the reader, and which
the story of sentiment brings to the surface. On 31 July 1769 he writes: ‘believe
me, where genuine sentiment and feeling are at bottom, we cannot write with
toomuch freedom; and the reader will be pleas’d in proportion as these qualities
(c) Modern Humanities Research Assn
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reside in himself’.upsilonasperacute Sentimental writing works by depicting minor details which
‘their intimates’ can recognize, and thus their passions are aroused (p. 37). The
way poetry speaks to the heart and creates a link between author and reader is
‘like ﬁnding some family picture in a stranger’s house; we conclude ourselves
acquainted, and are friends at the ﬁrst sight’ (pp. 51–52). It needs a scene of
recognition, brought about by literature, for an already existent familiarity and
community to come to light. The function of the literature Mackenzie under-
takes to write is to bring about such scenes of recognition. Thus, the introduc-
tion ofTheMan of Feeling o·ers twomodels with which the reader can identify,
grouping the readers into those who would and those who would not save the
novel from complete destruction. ‘Which reader are you’, the novel seems to
ask, ‘the curate or his friend?’ The reader can testify to his or her true sensibility
by reading on, and proving to be a better ‘man of feeling’ than the curate.
One of the novel’s ﬁrst readers, the educationalist James Elphinston, falls
into the trap and immediately accepts the novel’s invitation into the commu-
nity of sentimental readers. Soon after the publication of The Man of Feeling,
he expressed to Mackenzie his dissatisfaction with the fragmentariness of the
novel in a friendly correspondence. ‘His truly sentimental friends’, he writes,
would like to see Harley’s story ‘in a more consistent dress; to see him begun,
continued (though diversiﬁed) and ended, perhaps, with a prospect of similar
prosperity.’ In its present fragmented condition the introduction can please
only those ‘who cannot taste the man of feeling; and whose praise, if they should
bestow any, would but make him blush’. Joining the group of the sentimental
readers, he is happy that ‘every reader of feeling’ received Harley as a brother,
but he ﬁnds the behaviour of the curate coarse and insensible. No doubt it
should hurt the sensibility of true men of feeling that a novel of genuine emo-
tion has an introduction where even the one who saved the manuscript from
destruction refuses to weep over it, claiming that ‘one is ashamed to be pleased
with the works of one knows not whom’. Elphinston probably never notices
that the ‘insensible’ curate saved another text, the German Illustrissimi, which
his sensible friend had destined for the same kind of destruction. Elphinston
knew without thinking which party to join. Thus, the scenery of ruin and dis-
appointment and the damage to the manuscript show a melancholy prospect
not in order to express resignation and pessimism, but in order to call out for a
community of men of feeling to salvage the fragments and turn back the process
of destruction. The reader is invited—and even pressed—not only to read about
upsilonasperacute Henry Mackenzie, Letters to Elizabeth Rose of Kilravock: On Literature, Events and People
1768–1815, ed. by Horst Drescher (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1967), p. 17. (Fur-
ther references to this edition are given after quotations in the text.) Mackenzie and Elizabeth
Rose started to correspond in 1768, when the young Mackenzie settled down in Edinburgh after
ﬁnishing his legal studies in London. His cousin, living in Kilravock Castle, was his literary con-
ﬁdante, to whomhe sent ﬁnished chapters ofTheMan of Feeling, on whichElizabeth commented.
As Mackenzie writes to her in October 1770, ‘you are not only mistress of my thoughts but you
have them even in embryo’ (p. 54).
 Letter to Henry Mackenzie of 4 May 1771, in Literature and Literati: The Literary Corre-
spondence and Notebooks of Henry Mackenzie, i: Letters 1766–1827, ed. by Horst W. Drescher
(Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1989), pp. 50–51. Drescher presents this letter in Elphinston’s in-
novative spelling, which I here standardize, as Drescher also does later.
 Man of Feeling, p. 49.
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but also to be the true man of feeling, buying into an institutionalized culture of
tears and compassion. Even if its ﬁctional narrator did not weep, Mackenzie’s
contemporaries could not—or sometimes did not dare to—resist their tears.
Mirroring Minds
Like the novel’s manuscript, its protagonist is a tool devised to ﬁnd—and
produce—sentimental readers. Harley is a character who, like a mirror, deﬂects
the reader’s gaze, shifting it away from Harley onto all those who narrate, see,
and read him. To explain Harley’s naively trustful way of reading the perso-
nality of others, the narrator of The Man of Feeling describes his protagonist’s
mind as follows:
Though I am not of opinion with some wise men, that the existence of objects depends
on idea; yet, I am convinced, that their appearance is not a little inﬂuenced by it. The
optics of someminds are in so unlucky a perspective, as to throw a certain shade on every
picture that is presented to them; while those of others (of which number was Harley)
like the mirrors of the ladies, have a wonderful e·ect in bettering their complexions.
Through such a medium perhaps was he looking on his present companion. (p. 63)
The narrator places Harley’s subjectivity within a framework of inﬂuential
ideas circulating in eighteenth-century culture. The description of Harley’s
mind, however, simultaneously reveals the speaker’s own narrative and episte-
mological standpoint. When describing Harley, the narrator interprets Harley’s
way of reading the world. While Harley reads the character of ‘gentleman’ into
the sycophant who aspires to be one (p. 66), the narrator admits that his own
reading of Harley is also determined by subjective factors. The exposure of
Harley’s distorting vision is at the same time the narrator’s self-exposure, and
a confession of his own epistemological scepticism. His framework of thought
is embedded in its context of contemporary philosophical ideas on subjectivity
and perception—a Humean stance on the relations between the world, reason,
and the human subject, and a Berkeleian perspective on vision. It is the posi-
tion of ‘scepticism with regard to the senses’ from which the narrator of The
Man of Feeling admits to be speaking, and which also characterizes Harley’s
way of reading the world through the inﬂuence of his own state of mind. The
tentative ‘perhaps’ in the last line further unsettles our conﬁdence in the nar-
rator’s actual knowledge. Claiming from a perspective of distorted vision and
 In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume questions the existence of objects as distinct
from our mind and perception. Moreover, in Hume’s opinion, it is not only external existence
that should be treated with doubt, but our own body, which is also accessible to us only through
sense perception. Ideas of doubt regarding the external world that is accessible to us only through
the senses had also been advocated by earlier philosophers of the period. In the Essay towards a
New Theory of Vision (1709), George Berkeley argues that all we see is not the objects themselves,
but a signifying system of the external world. The knowledge we can have of external objects
is an interpretation given by the mind to the information gained by us via perception. In John
Locke’s theory, our knowledge of the world is entirely dependent on processes of sensation and
reﬂection. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge and
P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 66–68 and 187–218; George Berkeley, ‘An
Essay towards a New Theory of Vision’ (1709), in The Works of George Berkeley, ed. by Alexan-
der Campbell Fraser, 4 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), i, 127–210; John Locke, An Essay
concerning Human Understanding (London, 1690; repr. London: Penguin, 1997), pp. 109–10.
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questionable knowledge that Harley’s vision is distorted shifts the reader’s at-
tention from character to narrator. The immersion of the narrative voice in the
philosophies of epistemological scepticism and uncertainty draws the reader
into a narratological puzzle. We might wonder who the narrator’s utterance
actually relates to when he is speaking about the main character. Whose story
are we reading here? And who, or what, is the man of feeling?
The metaphor of mind as looking-glass appears in a number of philosophical
texts that helped form ideas which were inﬂuential in the cultural production
of sensibility. In writings by John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith,
this metaphor marks an instability or even crisis related to the concept of a
coherent, self-su¶cient, knowing and feeling subject. Hume’s A Treatise of
Human Nature (1739) depicts human minds as mirrors that reﬂect passions,
sentiments, and opinions. In a self-inducing sympathy, a person’s emotions and
opinions are reﬂected by other minds in a multiplicity of reverberations, until
original and mirror image become indistinguishable, and the dividing lines of
subjectivities become blurred. In the chapter that investigates the source of our
esteem for the rich and powerful, Hume writes:
In general we may remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only
because they reﬂect each other’s emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sen-
timents, and opinions, may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible
degrees.Thus the pleasurewhich a richman receives fromhis possessions,being thrown
upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem;which sentiments againbeingperceived
and sympathized with, increase the pleasure of the possessor, and, being once more re-
ﬂected, become a new foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder. [. . .] Here
then is a third rebound of the original pleasure, after which it is di¶cult to distinguish
the images and reﬂections, by reason of their faintness and confusion. (p. 365)
The consequences of such a multiple, sympathetic refraction are that it be-
comes less and less possible to distinguish to whom one’s feelings actually
belong. Feelings, mixed and intensiﬁed in their passage from self to self, allow
distinct subjectivities to slip into one another. The rich man not only has ma-
terial means, but he also possesses feelings borrowed from others who admire
the pleasure of his riches. His emotions are dependent on and constructed by
someone else’s feelings.
In Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) the ﬁgure of the
mirror refers to society, which provides the individual with feedback on his
 Smith and Humewere a direct inﬂuence onMackenzie.Mackenzie knew and admiredHume.
As a lawyer of aristocratic descent, he mixed with those literati who contributed to the lively
intellectual scene of eighteenth-century Edinburgh, including, besides Hume and Smith, Henry
Home (Lord Kames), Hugh Blair, William Robertson, and Alexander Carlyle. Hume and Smith
were foundermembers of the Select Society established in 1754. See HaroldWilliam Thompson,
AScottishMan of Feeling: Some Account of Henry Mackenzie, Esq. of Edinburgh and of the Golden
Age of Burns and Scott (London andNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress, 1931), p. 40, andMullan,
‘The Language of Sentiment’, p. 275. For the comparison of the human mind to a looking-glass
in John Locke’s philosophy see Essay, p. 25, where the metaphor implies a mechanical, passive
receptivity of the mind to external ideas.
 For an investigation of the period’s fascination with exploring where feelings come from,
how they are transmitted, and to whom they belong, see Adela Pinch, Strange Fits of Passion:
Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996). As
Pinch argues, many eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centurywriters discover that one’s feelings
may not really be one’s own (pp. 2–3).
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or her behaviour and passions. It is through the internalization of this mirror
that the individual’s emotional development is brought about. If one grows
up in complete isolation, Smith argues, one will not be able to think of one’s
sentiments and conduct, nor of the beauty or deformity of one’s face. Brought
into society, the individual is instantly provided with a mirror, which is placed
in ‘the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark
when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is
here that he ﬁrst views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the
beauty and deformity of his own mind’. Smith uses the trope of the mirror to
argue that the moral and emotional self is not self-su¶cient and cannot develop
without the reﬂection provided by our internal looking-glass, representing the
judgement of other moral, emotional, and social beings. Following the positive
or negative responses of society to the individual’s actions and feelings, the
person’s ‘desires and actions, his joys and sorrows, will now often become the
causes of new desires and new aversions, new joys and new sorrows’ (p. 129).
Morals and emotions are born out of the judgements of the other within the
self, which Smith calls the ‘impartial spectator’ or ‘man within the breast’. This
impartial spectator is the internalized mirror that—like Harley’s mind—turns
us into a better person when we look into it. Thus, the mirror of society is
formative of the a·ective, moral self that it simultaneously inhabits.
The looking-glass metaphor in Mackenzie’s novel brings into play a similar
disruption of coherence, subversion of self-su¶ciency, and displacement of the
centre of human subjectivity. Harley’s mind, as we learn from the novel, is a
distorting mirror, which not only reﬂects but also improves the complexion of
those who look into it. On the one hand, the trope of the looking-glass is used
by the narrator to expose Harley’s technique of reading—one that projects the
reader’s own goodness and benevolence onto the rest of theworld. This explains
Harley’s social awkwardness and serves as the reason for his frequent exploita-
tion and victimization by fraudsters during his journey. For Harley, the world
is benevolent and good, because he sees only himself in every countenance.
On the other hand, as the metaphor of the mirror in its philosophical context
suggests, Harley, even though he is presented as the central character, never
becomes the subject in question. Every act of attention directed at him brings
about the deﬂection of the viewer, and a shift of focus. Like the fawning crowd
feeding the vanity and producing the passions of the rich in Hume’s Treatise,
Harley is no subject himself, but an object used for the production of someone
else’s subjectivity and passions—a subjectivity incomplete without the other.
Like themanuscript found by the curate and his friend, Harley is searching for,
and produces, men of feeling. Where he turns up, the world shows a di·erent
face. In this way, the story of the man of feeling is always the story of someone
else: of the one who sees, reads, and narrates.
 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cam-
bridgeUniversity Press, 2002), p. 129. Further references to this edition are given after quotations
in the text.
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Sympathy and its Discontents
Sentimental novels of the period often warn about the dangers inherent in mo-
ments of sympathy, as theorized by Hume and Smith, where the boundaries of
the self are thrown into crisis and where the other’s emotions can be mistaken
for one’s own. Scenes of charity can point to the pitfalls of benevolence and
highlight the darker side of the sympathetic impulse advocated by the philoso-
phers of the eighteenth-century moral-sense school. Encounters with the poor
are a recurring motif in sentimental novels. Beggars, the poor, and the needy
crowds surrounding a wealthy benefactor are the ‘other’ in whose presence the
virtues of sensibility manifest themselves, and who hold up a mirror to the va-
lues, vanities, and vices of sensible men and women of means. Most of the time,
however, the scene of charity reveals more of the one who gives than the one
who begs.upsilonaspertilde The beggar’s way to earn his payment is often to assume the role
of the double with whom the potential benefactor can easily identify. In Sarah
Fielding’s The Adventures of David Simple (1744), for example, David (the
protagonist) is betrayed by his greedy younger brother, Daniel, who secretly
forges the will of their deceased father, leaving David with practically nothing.
Daniel, who formerly pretended to love the benevolent and talented David,
now abuses his impoverished brother and tries to make him his dependant.
When the outraged David leaves his brother’s house in despair, he gives away
one of his last shillings to a beggar who appears to be his mirror image. As the
beggar tells him, he too was ‘turned out of doors by an unnatural brother’.
Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakeﬁeld (1766) calls attention to the pos-
sible discontent behind the narcissistic satisfaction of mutual mirroring. As
both Goldsmith’s and Fielding’s novels show, the danger for the sentimental
benefactor lies in giving away much more than one’s fortune; it can possibly lie
in losing the centre of one’s self and placing it in the other. Disappointed by the
hypocritical ﬂattery and mock-friendship of dependants, Sir William Thorn-
hill, the wealthy aristocrat of Goldsmith’s novel, walks around disguised as an
honest but poor man, Mr Burchell, in order to ﬁnd true friendship and virtue.
When SirWilliam was younger, he enjoyed the adulation of dependants to such
an extent that most of his pleasures were derived from ﬂattery. The ﬁgure of Sir
William takes to the furthest limits the outlook voiced in the moral philosophy
of Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, and Francis Hutcheson.
According to Shaftesbury, to possess ‘natural a·ections’ that promote the good
and beneﬁt of the public also involves having a·ections that make our own selves
happy. A considerable part of our pleasure, he claims, derives from sharing the
delight and contentment of others, and receiving positive a·ections in sympathy
with them. Our acts are naturally performed with reference to another person,
in expectation of the admiration, esteem, kindness, or even ﬂattery we receive in
upsilonaspertilde See e.g. Yorick’s pleasure in distributing his money among a group of beggars or his deter-
mination not to give anything to the Franciscan monk in Sterne’s Sentimental Journey (1768). At
one point Yorick uses the scene of begging to expose female vanity, where the act of charity is
performed in expectation of undeserved praise. See Laurence Sterne, A Sentimental Journey, ed.
by Ian Jack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 6–7, 35–37, and 107–09.
 Sarah Fielding, The Adventures of David Simple, ed. by Malcolm Kelsall (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 19.
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return. Francis Hutcheson—the most important disseminator of Shaftesbury’s
ideas in Scotland—explains altruism by the presence of a so-called ‘moral sense’
in human nature. This, Hutcheson claims, is an ability that makes us impul-
sively approve of and be pleased withwhatever is virtuous—that is, those actions
and a·ections that promote the good and well-being of others. Hutcheson also
argues that our disinterested acts can be explained only by the innate benevo-
lence of human nature, which is the universal foundation of moral sense.	
Goldsmith, however, shows how the idea of natural goodness and the belief
in a love that both gives pleasure to the individual and creates the bonds of so-
ciety can potentially turn against themselves, becoming the very tool of social
isolation and the disintegration of the self. Sir William Thornhill ‘began to lose
private interest in universal sympathy’ by a pathological form of sensibility:
Physicians tell us of a disorder in which the whole body is so exquisitely sensible that the
slightest touch gives pain. What some have thus su·ered in their persons, this gentle-
man felt in his mind: the slightest distress, whether real or ﬁctitious, touched him to the
quick, and his soul laboured under a sickly sensibility of the miseries of others.upsilonasperacute
Making one’s feelings entirely dependent on those of others not only brings
about poverty, but impoverishes and empties out the very core of the self,
threatening it with destruction. While his over-generosity leads Sir William
into giving away his fortune, he gradually loses the adoration and ﬂattery of
those who used to need his support. The more he ﬁts into the sentimental
ideal, the less opportunity he has for practising this ideal. As his example
shows, living exclusively for the social a·ections paradoxically quenches both
the social feelings and the pleasures of the self that derive from such feelings:
‘But in proportion as he became contemptible to others, he became despicable
to himself. His mind had leaned upon their adulation, and that support taken
away, he could ﬁnd no pleasure in the applause of his heart, which he had
never learned to reverence’ (p. 28). The self of the sentimental man of feeling
is centred in the other, and is therefore not self-su¶cient. Acting supportively
and charitably towards the other is a personal need, motivated by easing one’s
own mental pain—comparable to the agonies of the sensible body—caused by
the other’s slightest distress. Besides, it is done in expectation of a reward, a
positive feedback on which one’s entire consciousness depends.
In The Vicar of Wakeﬁeld Sir William Thornhill recognizes a trap: domi-
nance intermingled with too great reliance on the feelings of the other actually
jeopardizes the very mastery the self claims as its own. On the surface the chari-
table man of sensibility lives only for the good of the other. But the guise of
the goodman hides a structure that cannot be thought outside hierarchies. The
bonds of love that create the social ties in Shaftesbury turn out to have the same
root as the bond that ties together master and slave, as outlined later by Hegel.
	 AnthonyAshleyCooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury,Characteristics ofMen, Manners, Opinions,
Times, ed. by Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1999), p. 204; Francis
Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; in Two Treatises.
(London: J. Darby, 1725), p. 132.
upsilonasperacute Oliver Goldsmith, The Vicar of Wakeﬁeld: A Tale. Supposed to be Written by Himself (Lon-
don: F. Newbery, 1766), pp. 26–27. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in
the text.
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Extreme sensibility is not simply an intense reactive state of both mind and
body, but a form of pathological dependence. Growing out of a mutual need, it
is a form of dominance where even the person of higher social status ultimately
becomes dependent for recognition and for his very existence on the people he
supports. The ‘natural a·ections’ of the man of feeling, when put into social
practice, remain narcissistic and do not make mutual recognition possible.
Jessica Benjamin addresses a similar problem in relation to classical (mainly
Freudian) discourses of psychoanalysis, where interpersonal interactions are
seen in terms of a subject–object relationship, which dynamic endangers the
recognition of the other person as inherently independent from the perceptions
of the self. As Benjamin argues, the other is ‘not merely the object of the ego’s
need/drive or cognition/perception but has a separate and equivalent center
of self. Intersubjective theory postulates that the other must be recognized as
another subject in order for the self to fully experience his or her subjectivity
in the other’s presence.’ Benjamin claims that domination is not something
to be readily assumed; it is not a psychological inevitability, but something that
develops culturally out of the breakdown of an initial intersubjective state, a
collapse of mutual recognition. For Hegel, she claims, as well as for classical
psychoanalysis, the breakdown of this mutuality is inevitable. InHegel’s theory
the omnipotent ego, no matter how strongly it strives for independence, must
still face a fundamental paradox: the independence and power of the master is
interrelated with its being acknowledged by the subordinate party. The abso-
luteness of the self is inevitably undermined by the recognition of the other on
which it necessarily depends.
Thus, discourses of sensibility and psychoanalysis often struggle with similar
questions regarding the vicissitudes of the self in its interpersonal relationships.
Sentimental novels show how hard it is to grasp the psychological reality of
such an intersubjective state and the recognition of the other as subject rather
than object. What love, these novels seem to ask, could fulﬁl our wish for an
intersubjective recognition when even the love of the good man, the love of
benevolence that creates the social bond, is like a hall of mirrors? The ﬁgure
of the man of feeling, I would like to suggest, is a textual locus for the attempt
to realize this mutuality which for most Western societies has always remained
a di¶cult task, if not an impossible one. The sentimental novel, if it cannot
o·er a solution, at least conveys the awareness of the necessity of such an ideal
state. It achieves its goal by rendering reading problematic, showing why and
how reading matters as an individual and a·ective task that also has social and
political consequences. It is, after all, a process of reading in which the other
person as similar or di·erent, as object or subject, is understood. As sentimen-
tal novels show, the bonds of society are dependent on the transferential bond
 Jessica Benjamin, Like Subjects, Love Objects: Essays on Recognition and Sexual Di·erence
(NewHaven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 30.
 JessicaBenjamin,The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis,Feminism, and the Problem of Domination
(New York: Pantheon, 1988), pp. 7–8, 32–33. See also Sigmund Freud, ‘Group Psychology and
the Analysis of the Ego’ (1921), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
SigmundFreud, ed. by James Strachey and others, 24 vols (London: Vintage, 2001), xviii, 67–143
(hereafter SE); Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis and A·ect,
trans. by Douglas Brick and others (Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1992), pp. 1–14.
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of the reading process and are shaped by the mutual emotional investment of
the participants. The otherness of the other, however, remains di¶cult to access
since it can be found only beyond the transferences on which the literature of
sensibility depends, beyond the bonds of Shaftesbury’s ‘natural a·ections’.
Playing with the literary tradition that centres on the ﬁgure of the bene-
factor, Mackenzie’s Harley does not want to let the beggar hold up the usual
mirror. Instead, he tries to allow space for the recognition of otherness. While
the beggar o·ers to tell Harley his future—something all passers-by want to
hear—Harley asks for the beggar’s own story instead, giving him an opportu-
nity to explain how he became a fortune-teller. Thus Harley wants to listen to
the story of su·ering that had always been silenced or disbelieved by others; as
the beggar complains:
I told all mymisfortunes truly, but they were seldom believed; and the few who gave me
a half-penny as they passed, did it with a shake of the head, and an injunction, not to
trouble them with a long story. [. . .] I changedmy plan, and, instead of telling my own
misfortunes, began to prophesy happiness to others. This I found by much the better
way: folks will always listen when the tale is their own; and of many who say they do not
believe in fortune-telling, I have known few on whom it had not a very sensible e·ect.
(p. 61, emphasis added)
The beggar explains how ‘every one is anxious to hear what they wish to be-
lieve’ (p. 61). If he wants to survive, the story he tells must be the fulﬁlled wish
of the listener o·ered in the guise of the future.
The encounter between Harley and the beggar soon turns into a Humean
meeting of mirrors, where wishes and stories are reﬂected and mingled in a
multiplicity of reverberations. Harley urges the beggar to ‘let me know some-
thing of your profession; I have often thought of turning fortune-teller for a
week or two myself’ (p. 60). Understanding that Harley appreciates frankness,
the professional liar confesses that he makes a living by telling lies. He endea-
vours to satisfy Harley with the true and ‘entertaining’ story he wishes to hear
(p. 60). Facing the man of feeling, he is compelled to show himself in a better
light if he wants to proﬁt from the encounter, so he boasts of having ‘had the
humour of plain-dealing in me from a child’, and claims that ‘I was in some
sort forced to the trade, for I dealt once in telling the truth’ (p. 60). Harley
gets what he wanted to hear; the story of the beggar’s life remains Harley’s
wish-fulﬁlment, presented as the truth behind the profession of lying, but still
from within the economic conventions of that profession. The beggar ends up
narrating the story of the interesting business Harley himself wanted to try out
for a short time, in others words, exactly what the man of feeling ‘wishes to
believe’ about begging. His story had to reveal the secrets of fortune-telling, be
entertaining and worth Harley’s money. While Harley’s mind, so to say, betters
the complexion of the beggar’s narrative, the beggar’s story, in its turn, reﬂects
the wish of his benefactor.
 For the operation of transference in the process of reading see Peter Brooks, ‘The Idea of a
Psychoanalytic Criticism’, in The Trial(s) of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Franc«oise Meltzer and Peter
Rudnytsky (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 145–59 (pp. 152–55);
and Jerre Collins and others, ‘Questioning the Unconscious’, in In Dora’s Case, ed. by Charles
BernheimerandClaireCahane (NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1990), pp. 243–53 (p. 252).
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The act of charity shows a similarly controversial face: ‘Harley had drawn a
shilling from his pocket; but virtue bade him consider on whom he was going
to bestow it.—Virtue held back his arm:—but a milder form, a younger sister
of virtue’s, not so severe as virtue, not so serious as pity, smiled upon him: his
ﬁngers lost their compression;—nor did virtue o·er to catch the money as it
fell’ (p. 61). Theman of feeling is a tool, rather than the subject, of his own emo-
tions. His act of charity is not a voluntary, self-conscious decision of a sensible
mind, but the work of an involuntary moment caused by the mechanical oper-
ation of sympathy. The sympathy between poor and rich is brought about by
the cunning tale of the beggar, making the fantasy of the rich materialize in the
story of the poor. It is on the basis of the illusion of similarity that an encounter
can take place. Rather than being a scene of recognition and giving, Harley’s
act of charity remains an economic exchange that sustains social hierarchies.
It takes a feeling reader to identify every charitable act with a corresponding
sensible heart—a reader for whom Harley’s mind can function like a looking-
glass that makes the complexion of the world better. Mary Wollstonecraft’s
novelMaria; or, The Wrongs of Woman (1798) draws attention to the important
political stakes of being educated into such a way of reading. Wollstonecraft
shows how serious the problem becomes when the looking-glass that improves
one’s appearance is really a lady’s mental mirror. Maria’s reading, governed by
the fantasy image of a man of feeling who makes the world’s face better, has
tragic consequences. George Venables, her future husband, abuser, and perse-
cutor, gains Maria’s love by performing a charitable act which, forMaria, is the
emblem of a feeling heart. The guinea which Venables gives toMaria in support
of the distressed Peggy, asMaria recalls, ‘invested my hero withmore thanmor-
tal beauty. My fancy [. . .] quickly went to work, with all the happy credulity of
youth, to consider that heart devoted to virtue, which had only obeyed a virtu-
ous impulse.’AsMaria has to learn fromher own bitter experience, the ideal of
theman of feeling can easily remain an empty pose, an apparatus through which
the ideology of patriarchy reasserts itself. Obeying a virtuous impulse, asHarley
did, does not necessarily imply a virtuous heart, hiding as it does the potential
bonds that tie together master and slave: theunyielding dynamics of dominance.
Mobile Identities
Harley’s sympathetic lens even makes it possible for the horrors of the eight-
eenth-century madhouse to acquire a more pleasant complexion. Harley’s
friends are shown around Bedlam by a cruel keeper, who introduces the mad
‘in the phrase of those that keep wild beasts for shew’ (p. 67) and presents
a terrifying scene of clanking chains and horrid, wild cries. Harley himself,
however, is approached by a ‘decent-looking man’ who o·ers to give him ‘a
more satisfactory account of the unfortunate people you see here’ (p. 67). The
stranger goes up to him when Harley falls behind his companions and lingers
within the world of Bedlam for a short time instead of following the rhythm
of the sane. As it turns out at the end of the episode, this man is one of the
 MaryWollstonecraft,Mary; andThe Wrongs of Woman, ed. by Gary Kelly (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 135.
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inhabitants, and thinks himself to be ‘the Chan of Tartary’. It is only theman of
feeling among the visitors who is singled out and taken on a private tour of the
madhouse. The world of the mad does not open up for the regular visitor—it
can open up only for the man of feeling.
The mad guide’s story of Bedlam is indeed di·erent from the one the cruel
keeper has to o·er. The inmates are not wild beasts, madmen, or maniacs any
more but ‘unfortunate people’. The mad Newtonian scientist whose cosmolo-
gical calculations did not work according to plan is ‘a gentleman who had once
been a celebrated mathematician’, who ‘fell a sacriﬁce’ to science (p. 67). Harley
is introduced to talented people, many of whom had once been well known for
their achievements. The mad guide characterizes them through what they used
to be rather than by naming them as anything in the present; their identity
and humanity lie in the story of their past. As he points out to Harley, apropos
of the businessman whom bankruptcy reduced to madness: ‘this [. . .] was a
gentleman well known in Change-alley’ (p. 68, emphasis added). The man who
constantly recites poetry is introduced as a ‘ﬁgure’ who ‘was a schoolmaster of
some reputation’, and interrupts their conversation as a ‘voice’ (p. 68). From the
guide’s perspective he did not lose his wits by trying to solve a di¶cult problem
but he ‘came hither’—as if by his own will—‘to be resolved of some doubts he
entertained concerning the genuine pronunciation of the Greek vowels’ (p. 68).
The scholar of poetry is himself a ﬁgure. He is only a trope in the story Harley’s
guide tells about him—a trope of his luckier and more glorious past.
For the mad guide, Bedlam is a place inhabited by gentlemen, unfortunate
people, voices, ﬁgures, ghosts, and indeﬁnable creatures whose identity can be
caught only in the grammatical past tense. This scene of Bedlam is a text whose
ﬁgures stand for stories of interesting and once successful human beings now
turned into mere signiﬁers—a text completely di·erent from what the cruel
keeper o·ered the visitors, who, as a result, took ﬂight in horror. The di·erent
perspectives of the two guides construct Bedlam as a text dependent on its nar-
rator, which text makes it impossible for both visitors and inmates to assume
and construct stable identities. The inhabitants are conﬁned by verbal signs that
can mean anything depending on the reader: a prison-house of language. In the
ﬁgure of the guide Harley ﬁnds his double, another man of feeling, and it is
only between the twomen of feeling—or twomadmen—that a conversation can
take place. Through the language of history and poetry, Harley and the guide
enter into a mental domain which assumes the universality of madness and its
underlying presence in all human actions. The guide proposes that madness
is a condition that overﬂows the walls of Bedlam: ‘the world, in the eye of a
philosopher, may be said to be a large madhouse’ (p. 69). Harley agrees, and
only after this agreement has been established does the guide reveal his ‘true’
identity as the Chan of Tartary, and therefore his delusion. Like the other in-
habitants of Bedlam, he turns out to be a half-ﬁctional character from a story
of the past, a ﬁgure lacking existence in the present.
Sigmund Freud, in his reading of Wilhelm Jensen’s Gradiva, gives account
of an encounter where delusion and sanity have to speak the same language in
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order for a cure to take place. The hero of Jensen’s novella, the archaeologist
Norbert Hanold, is driven by a delusion to ﬁnd the reality behind an ancient
bas-relief representing a girl with a distinctive gait. When tracing the reality of
the gait in his present environment does not bring the desired results, he under-
takes a trip to Pompeii, where he indeed ﬁnds a woman with the Gradiva-gait
whomatches his fantasy. The girl, Zoe Bertgang, Hanold’s once intimate child-
hood friend (whom the scholar had simply foreclosed from his consciousness),
enters into a conversation with the obsessed archaeologist. By assuming the
role of the revenante the man takes her to be, Zoe can uncover the nature of
the other’s madness. As Freud writes, she accepts the young man’s delusion
only in order to set him free from it. Curing his delusion is possible only by
‘taking up the same ground as the delusional structure and then investigating
it as completely as possible’ (p. 22). This encounter is not simply an encounter
between sanity and madness as Freud presents it, but also a story about the
politics of reading. It is an allegory of reading and recognizing di·erence—an
encounter between woman and man where woman, in order to be noticed, has
to step into the male fantasy created around her existence.
The Bedlam episode in Mackenzie’s novel presents a similar scenario. Here
themad guide has to assume the fantasy ofHarley in order that hemay be heard.
Becoming the reﬂection of the man of feeling, the mad guide presents a better,
more humane, more sympathetic story of the horrors of Bedlam. The only
way for madness to raise a voice against the dehumanization and the forgetting
imposed on it by society is to assume the identity of sanity. But when the guide
reveals his identity, Harley notices for the ﬁrst time—and shies away from—
their di·erence. The moment otherness is revealed, it is instantly rejected by
the man of feeling, whose fantasy it has been to see a world of feeling. When he
discovers what world he has been in the process of entering, he is ‘struck by this
discovery’, and abandons it: ‘he had prudence enough, however, to conceal his
amazement, and bowing as low to the monarch as his dignity required, left him
immediately, and joined his companions’ (p. 69). The world of the mad needs
to speak the language of sensibility in order to claim recognition—a recognition
that is eventually denied even by the man of feeling himself.
In the women’s ward, Harley listens to the story of the melancholy girl who
lost her lover, Billy, and became a means of ﬁnancial exchange in an unhappy
marriage arranged by her father. The girl’s madness lies in not being able to feel
emotions or shed tears any more: ‘I would weep too, but my brain is dry; and it
burns, burns, burns!’ (p. 70). Harley’s resemblance to the dead Billy activates a
scene ofmutual transferences: ‘I would not have youweep: you are likemyBilly;
you are, believe me; just so he looked when he gave me this ring; poor Billy!’
(pp. 70–71). While the girl identiﬁes Harley with her lost lover, the melancholy
Harley can similarly identify with, and sense his future in the fate of, the dead
 SigmundFreud, ‘Delusions andDreamsin Jensen’sGradiva’ (1907), inSE, ix, 7–95;Wilhelm
Jensen,Gradiva (1903), trans. by Helen M. Downey (Los Angeles: Sun andMoon, 1993).
 For feminist readingsof Freud’sreadingofGradiva see SarahKofman, ‘Summarize, Interpret
(Gradiva)’, in Freud and Fiction, trans. by Sarah Wykes (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp. 85–117;
Mary Jacobus, ‘Is There a Woman in This Text?’, in Reading Woman (London:Methuen, 1986),
pp. 83–109; Rachel Bowlby, ‘One Foot in the Grave’, in Still Crazy after All These Years: Women,
Writing and Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 157–82.
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Billy, who also left his lover in the hope of bettering his fortune. The mad
girl, like Jensen’s deluded Norbert, touches her companion, holds his hand and
presses it to her bosom, and ﬁnally puts Billy’s ring on Harley’s ﬁnger. Harley’s
tears make the girl—previously thoughtful and silent—speak and feel again.
The scene of sensibility also a·ects the other visitors: ‘except the keeper’s, there
was not an unmoistened eye around her’ (p. 70). In contrast to Freud’s reading
ofGradiva, touching the other is not a test of the reality of the other; it does not
provide a possible way out of the delusion, but remains within the bounds of the
transference. It is by touching the body of Harley that the mad girl turns him
into Billy and forces him back into the fantasy. The production of emotional
responses characteristic of sensibility is made possible only by fastening tight
theweb of transferences by which both self and other are helplessly bound. The
man of feeling needs to be (in) the other in order for sensibility to be produced.
The ‘man of feeling’, therefore, is not Harley; it is an emotional lens, a
technique of reading (through feeling) rather than a pre-existent character or
personality type. The construction of the ‘man of feeling’ implies an always
shifting perspective. Harley, for those who read him, is a hollowed-out ﬁgure
eternally mobilized by—and mobilizing—someone else’s emotions. This pro-
cess is well illustrated by the scene of Harley’s death. The narrator, a friend of
Harley’s, attempts to reanimate Harley’s lifeless body, ‘stretched without sense
or feeling’ in front of him:
I took his hand in mine; I repeated his name voluntarily:—I felt a pulse in every vein at
the sound. I looked earnestly in his face; his eye was closed, his lip pale and motionless.
There is an enthusiasm in sorrow that forgets impossibility. I wondered that it was so.
The sight drew a prayer from my heart; it was the voice of frailty, and of man! the
confusion of my mind began to subside into thought; I had time to weep! (p. 138)
Tears are the marks of an illusion experienced by the narrator. The illusion is
that of prosopopoeia, a trope through which the inanimate becomes animate.
The pulse of the corpse is the narrator’s own pulse, wished into the other’s
body. His illusory reanimation is an ‘enthusiasm of sorrow’ (p. 97), in which
the other’s feelings are, in reality, one’s own. In Adam Smith’s The Theory
of Moral Sentiments our horriﬁc and melancholy picture of the dead is the re-
sult of a similar reanimation, which Smith theorises as an act of sympathetic
identiﬁcation. Our grief results
from our putting ourselves in their situation, and from our lodging, if I may be allowed
to say so, our own living souls in their inanimated bodies, and thence conceiving what
would be our emotions in this case. It is from this very illusion of the imagination, that
the foresight of our own dissolution is so terrible to us. (p. 16)
By the end of the novel the narrator has become a Harley-ﬁgure. Sitting inside
Harley’s favourite place, the hollow tree, he turns into a container for noble
feelings: Harley’s lens of sympathy has softened his hatred of the world into
pity. Similarly, when we mourn Harley we wish to revive the man of feeling
by recovering our own humanity lodged in the other. The death of the man of
feeling repeats the gesture of the novel’s introduction, inviting us to mobilize
our sympathy and reconstruct the community of genuine sentiment.
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Like the curate’s friend in the novel’s introduction, readers did save this novel.
It went through a large number of editions from 1771 until the end of the cen-
tury, and has been constantly re-edited since.upsilonaspertilde But despite its textual survival,
it is, like most sentimental novels, often deemed ‘unreadable’ by today’s reading
public. Its late nineteenth-century editions even include an ‘Index to Tears’,
where the taxonomy of tearfulness is clearly presented as a curiosity, with the
possible intention of eliciting a mirthful response in the audience. While the
novel has recently gained an increasing amount of critical attention from those
specializing in the literature and history of sensibility, it remains on themargins
of the literary canon, even within the academic curriculum of major universi-
ties. The critical discourse through which the novel is salvaged today tends to
turn away from the complexity of emotional response altogether or distances
tearfulness into a historical past, which can be understood only by means of
scholarly contextualization. Mackenzie’s novel is retained by foreclosing the
issue of the tears it used to be able to trigger. We do not cry over sentimental
novels any more. Instead, we produce scholarly analyses from a safely detached
perspective in the present.
The novel’s marginalization, however, can serve to raise important questions.
Have our reading practices changed so much that we consider the eighteenth
century’s indulgence of the reader’s emotions distasteful or di¶cult to com-
prehend? Or do we simply shed di·erent tears now? Has the university itself
become a means for institutionalizing the foreclosure of emotional response?
And how long can we safely live in what Maureen Harkin calls a ‘distinctly
post-sentimental age’?	 Through its tears, Mackenzie’s novel teaches us some-
thing about reading. Like Freud’s interpretation ofGradiva, it exposes the way
in which one is deluded or seduced into a shared fantasy, while showing the
risks and di¶culties that arise in any encounter with the other. In our age, as
in Mackenzie’s, texts exist that—as sentimental novels once did—compel us
to absorb the values and ideologies of a culture by directly appealing to our
tears or our feelings. Making us conscious that our emotional responses do ex-
ist is a task that must be addressed by future practices of critical reading. The
reading practices encouraged within the academy must negotiate a space for
an a·ectivity that is theorized yet experienced at the same time. Reading the
sentimental novel with an attention to emotional response may help us become
aware of the ways in which the seductions and fantasies of our own contempo-
rary culture foreclose the issue of tears, which thereby escape being analysed
and understood by the very practices on which we rely for understanding.
P ,   
upsilonaspertilde For a list of the editions of Mackenzie’s novel see Thompson, pp. 417–18. The latest editions
are by Brian Vickers (2001) and Maureen Harkin (2005).
 The index ﬁrst appeared in HenryMorley’s 1886 edition and is reproduced in BrianVickers’s
2001 edition (pp. 110–11).
	 Harkin, introduction, p. 20.
